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Principles in Legislation
The Fortieth Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture delivered at the House of the Association on
April 22, 1986. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. is Professor of Law at Yale University School of Law.
By

GEOFFREY

C.

HAZARD, JR.*

The distinguished jurist after whom this series of lectures is
named, Benjamin Cardozo, gave a classic exposition entitled
The Nature of the JudicialProcess. 1 He was talking about decisionmaking by courts, although much of what he said can be
interpreted as referring to law-givers generally, whether they
be in courts or in legislatures. An earlier distinguished jurist,
Jeremy Bentham, gave another classic exposition entitled Principles of Legislation.2 He was talking about decision-making by
legislators, although Bentham like Cardozo also can be read as
referring to law-givers generally. An important theme of Cardozo's exposition was that the judicial process involved much
more than deductive application of legal rules, and that it
necessarily entailed some sort of calculus of normative considerations that transcends the reading of legal texts and drawing
deductions from them. Bentham directly addressed the nature
of that normative calculus, for in his view rational legal measures necessarily were founded in the principle of utility. That
is, legal rationality consisted of applying general principle,
specifically the principle of utility. Moreover, Bentham asserted
that proper legislation was derivable by a deductive analysis
from the principle of utility. I propose to juxtapose the subjects
of these famous expositions and thereby consider the nature of
the judicial process by exploring the role of principle in the
legislative process.
*Nathan Baker Professor of Law, Yale University.
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I. Introduction
A. The Question to be Considered

Suppose it were the case that legislation is substantially based
upon principle and upon reasoning according to principle? If
such were the case, it would seem to disconcert a great deal of
philosophical and professional discussion in the American legal
community about the nature and proper scope of the judicial
process. Such is the rhetorical purpose of this presentation: To
disconcert the widely though not universally held view the
judicial process employs a peculiar mode of principled reasoning which in turn peculiarly legitimates the judicial process.
On a prior occasion, I have questioned this assumption about
judicial reasoning through another line of argument. 3 That line
of argument was that a coherent interpretation of the legitimacy of what courts do must go beyond considerations of principle. The argument more specifically was that the judicial process not only necessarily but legitimately incorporates reference
to the historical context of the legal issue immediately before a
court, political determinants of the options open in any specific
legal controversy, and the nature of the commitment to the
future that is entailed in pronouncing rules that purport to be
ones of law. The prior argument therefore was that considerations of principle are not the sole proper ingredient of judicial
decisions. The present argument is that considerations of principle are not uniquely an ingredient of judicial decision.
The proposition that courts do not proceed simply on the
basis of principle is of course a familiar one. Actual or alleged
failures of courts to adhere to principle is at least as old a
grievance against the administration of justice as the grievance
against delay. However, it is one thing to say that judicial
deviation from principle is a ground for criticizing the judicial
institution, and quite another to say that judicial deviation from

principle must be understood and accepted on the way to
deeper understanding of how law is made and applied. When
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the observation is toward the latter end, consideration of the
role of legal principle in making law leads not necessarily to
outrage at the injustice of administered justice but to intensified
curiosity about the nature of administered justice-as Cardozo
called it, The Nature of the Judicial Process. Thus, the purpose
of such an inquiry can be. analytic rather than polemical.
So also in the present inquiry. The conclusion advanced here
is that courts are not unique in making decisions that are based
on principle, but that the decisions of legislatures necessarily
reflect considerations of principle as well. If that is true, then a
clear distinction between the function of courts and the function of legislatures cannot be drawn in terms of the presence
versus the absence of principles as a substantial element in the
decision-making process. And from that it would follow that we
have to go further or in some other direction to discern the
special characteristics of the judicial process, if indeed it has any
special characteristics that distinguish it from the legislative
process.
B. Some Similarities of Courts and Legislatures

Let us bring the question into sharper focus by noticing some
fundamental similarities between courts and legislatures. One
similarity is, of course, that they are both organs of government. That proposition is obvious, but its obviousness may
obscure its significance. That courts and legislatures are both
organs of government is significant at the very least because
courts and legislatures are in some sense accountable to the
whole political community. 4 By definition that is not true of any
institution in the private sector-such as a business, a church, a
family. The reference point of public accountability being inclusively the whole community, the process of public accountability must be one ultimately of internal review-What are
"we" doing?-rather than external review-What are "they"
doing? That being so, there is some minimal sense in which the
functions of courts and legislatures must be assessed according
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to a common normative standard.
Another fundamental similarity is that the provinces of the
judiciary and that of the legislature are largely coextensive in
terms of subject-matter. It is not the case, for example, that the
judiciary is concerned only with such matters as the rules of
contract while the legislature is concerned only with such matters as the rules of taxation, or that courts are concerned only
with private law while legislatures are concerned with matters
of public law. Quite the contrary. A clean subject-matter
boundary between adjudication and legislation cannot be
drawn because both the judicial power and the legislative power
in fact address themselves to virtually all legal subject-matter.
So also there is at best only a marginal distinction between the
judiciary and the legislature in terms of the relative generality
of the legal propositions with which they deal. It is a common
supposition that adjudication deals with particular situations,
while legislation with general classes of situations. 5 That distinction is substantially correct as applied to routine trial court
adjudication. However, it is only roughly tenable when it comes
to the kinds of adjudication that excite concern about the
legitimacy of the judiciary-test cases, leading edge cases, cases
where law is made, whether in trial courts or courts of appellate
jurisdiction. Adjudication of any specific leading edge case is
unintelligible only in terms of classes of cases, for "leading edge"
contemplates some body of legal rules with respect to which the
instant case is at the periphery. More fundamentally, adjudication affects general classes of cases even if it immediately
addresses only individual cases. 6 Correlatively, while legislation
immediately addresses classes of cases, legislation is intelligible
only when specific cases are brought to mind.7 These reciprocal
relations are reflected in the language used by courts and
legislatures. What legal propositions are more general, after all,
than "due process of law" or "equal protection of the laws"? And
what legal propositions are more specific, more narrowly focussed on specific instances, than some of the provisions of the
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Internal Revenue Code, or of the laws governing the structure of
government, or environmental protection regulations?
So also the judiciary's province is not satisfactorily demarked
by references to the composition of the judiciary as compared
with the legislature. Judges are, in the federal system at any
rate, appointed; legislators are elected, and hence hold office
on a fundamentally different constitutive basis. But that distinction, important as it is, is far from conclusive from an analytic
point of view, whatever might be our premises concerning
democratic theory. For one thing, it is not universally true that
judges are appointive and legislators elective. In many states in
this country the judiciary is constituted by election. For a long
time one branch of our national legislature formally was constituted by appointment, i.e., the Senate until adoption of the
XVII Amendment in 1913. More important as a practical
matter, much of our "legislation" consists of regulations promulgated by nonelective officials of administrative agencies.
Still more fundamentally, selection of nominees for the judiciary and for the legislature has important elements of similarityclearance by key power-brokers, acceptability to significant constituencies, etc. And in terms of socioeconomic background and
career experiences, judges and legislators generally are similar
types. We could also add that, at least in the American experience, both judges and legislators are much engaged in dealing
with specific cases as distinguished from the formulation of
general rules or policies. A lot of legislator time and energy go
into "legislative casework" as it is called. Indeed, legislative
"casework" is often a complement to or substitute for judicial
8
review of administrative action.
These important similarities are all obstacles to establishing a
satisfactory analytic distinction between the judicial function
and the legislative function.9 Hence, the classic endeavor, at
least in American jurisprudence, is the attempt to define the
province of the judiciary in terms of its intellectual process. In
American jurisprudence, that philosophical question is also a
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fundamental constitutional question, for it implicates the question of the separation of powers between the judiciary and the
legislature-the boundary between Article III and Article I. A
key element, if not the exclusive element, of the supposed
distinction between the judicial process and the legislative process is that the former, but not the latter, involves reasoning on
the basis of principle. However, if it appeared on reflection that
the modern legislative process and the modern judicial process
are really quite similar in their underlying intellectual method,
the conventionally accepted bases for defining the judiciary's
proper province would pro tanto be effaced.
C. Criteria in Pursuingthe Question

Entertaining the proposition that legislatures themselves are
in fact substantially guided by principle does not require saying
that legislatures in fact are guided by principle alone. The
essential character of a human institution, whether for the
purpose of analysis or for the purpose of appraisal, is not
drawn in terms of such an exacting criterion. We do not impose
that criterion in determining whether a court is a court. With
respect to courts, we are satisfied to say that precedent and
principle are characteristic of their decision-making, when we
find them to be salient therein, even though we also accept
Cardozo's thesis that the judicial process involves such other
dimensions as policy and personal normative preferences. Let
us apply a comparable standard to the legislature. Thus, the
question is: Granting that legal innovation and policy and
personal normative preferences play a substantial part in legislative law-making, is it not also true that principle plays a strong
and perhaps even dominant part?
This is not to say that principle plays the same part in the
rhetoric of legislative debates and in the legal product of legislation that it plays in the dialectic of advocacy before a court
and in decisions that emanate from adjudication. What legislators say on the hustings and in legislative debate, and in the
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corridors and cloakrooms, is indeed often quite different from
what advocates argue to judges and what judges expound in
their opinions. But that does not exclude the possibility that
legal principles largely explain what legislatures do. It is not, in
John Mitchell's phrase, that we should look only at what legislatures do and not what they say. It is rather that the rhetorical
vulgarity and partisan cupidity often manifested in the legislature's discourse can be considered mere trappings that disguise
a more rational process underneath the pattern of behavior
necessary for staying in office.'" In the work of the judiciary
that is done off the bench, we all know that there is also a good
deal of rhetorical vulgarity and partisanship. By the same
token, we have no difficulty in supposing that apparently reasoned discourse in judicial opinions is often a mere trapping
for vulgar and partisan casuistry. Why can we not accept the
converse? After all, economic analysis leads us to discern that
intelligible patterns of human conduct are expressed in the
apparent chaos of the market place, and indeed that the patterns produced by the market are more coherent than those
actually resulting from the supposedly concerted efforts of
public administration. In parallel fashion, we have to consider
the possibility that, in the main and with due allowance for the
legislative contrivances that facilitate re-election, the product of
a legislature is a lot more intelligible in terms of principle than
it presents itself as being.
II. The Nature of the Argument
The argument in support of this proposition consists of
synthesizing observed characteristics of the legislative process.
The argument is therefore suggestive rather than demonstrative, let alone being exhaustive.
With this in mind, I wish to bring into view four characteristics of the legislative process in addition to those already adverted to. First, if one looks at the content of legislation considered
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as a whole, its corpus is describable in terms of general normative principles. That such a description can be made would
seem possible only if such principles in fact guided the formation of the corpus of legislation in the first place. Of course, we
could consider the product of legislatures as accidentally coherent. This possibility brings in mind the classic fable concerning
the laws of chance that has to do with six apes at typewriters.
The story of course is that if six apes sat down at typewriters
long enough they would eventually replicate Shakespeare.
There are certainly some attractions in thinking of the legislature's product in this way. Perhaps something like that process
in fact was the genesis of the Internal Revenue Code. But on.
fuller reflection we recognize that it is simply against the laws of
probability that the general corpus of a country's legislation
would be describable in terms of principles unless that corpus
of law was in fact formulated on the basis of the principles in
terms of which it can be described.
Second, there is reason to think that legislatures are virtually
driven to refer to principle as a means of doing political business and thereby avoiding their own atrophy and political
demise. The argument is that a multi-member decisional body
such as a legislature, unless controlled by very powerful external incentives, tends to array itself into subgroups and that as so
arrayed tends toward deadlock. In a state of deadlock, the body'
becomes incapable of performing the very function it has been
constituted to perform and will atrophy or be abolished unless
it can escape this internal bondage. Falling back on principle is
a means by which the legislative body can resolve such deadlock. Hence, reliance on principle in decision-making may be
an intrinsic necessity for a legislature, perhaps even as much as
for courts.

Third, if we consider the logic by which adjudication proceeds, at least in the adversary system, it has a structure that is
in important respects similar to that by which statutes are
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formulated. In making this comparison, the key point is to
consider not only the products of the two processes-the legislative statute and the judicial decision-but the logic by which
the product takes shape prior to the point of final adoption.
The fourth aspect of the argument proceeds on a more
fundamental level. This is that the modern Western mind,
whether occupied in legislation or adjudication, is culturally
predisposed to think in terms of normative generalizations
when it thinks in normative terms at all. The modern mind
conceives of things in terms of abstracted characteristics and
properties rather than in terms of unique identities. For example, it thinks of the conduct of a "reasonable person," not
simply of the idiosyncratic conduct of specific persons. It thinks
of motor vehicles and not simply of specific metal objects at the
curbside. Correlatively, the modern mind is also more or less
scientific, thinking of transactions in terms of general rules of
-cause and consequence. It is in such terms that we can conceive
the notion of proximate cause in torts, or of "business income"
in taxation, or of conditions precedent in contract law. If the
modern mind thinks in these terms, the modern legislator like
the modern judge ordinarily thinks in general concepts whether he wants to or not. Someone once described the Illinois
legislature, I believe it was, as being constituted of the best
minds of the Twelfth Century. That may be so, and the same
thing might be said of the Upstate Caucus in Albany. But these
instances even if actually verified would only be exceptions that
prove the rule.
Let us further consider these points in order: That the
legislative product in fact is generally based on principles; that
legislation reflects general principles as a matter of political
necessity; that the logic of the legislative process is importantly
similar to the logic of the judicial process; and that legislation is
an expression of general principles because it is in such terms
that members of modern society think.
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III. The PrincipledContent of Legislation
It is an interesting problem how to determine whether a
1
corpus of legal rules expresses general principles or not. Yet
there seem to be ways of testing the proposition.
One is by inquiring whether there are bodies of law that
clearly are not based on principles, that is by using a technique'
of definition by contrast or exclusion. A search for such bodies
of law based not on principle brings one familiar instance
directly to mind: The Doomsday Book of William the Conqueror. It will be recalled that the Doomsday Book was a massive
compilation of the various usages, rights, and obligations of the
inhabitants of the English domain acquired by the conquering
Normans. 1 2 It was put together Wappentake by Wappentake,
vill by vill, messuage by messuage, recording how many hides
the tenant of Blackacre owed to his lord, what services were due
at Michaelmas and Easter, what obligations arose upon the
birth of a child or a marriage or a death. There are literally
thousands of entries of what the rules were-a huge mass of
normative particulars. There were no general principles. It was
only in the subsequent evolution of the common law imposed
by the King that general principles came into force. Indeed, it
was the common applicability-the generality-of the king's
English law and
law that distinguished it from the pre-existing
13
which led to its being called common law.
The condition revealed in Doomsday prevailed generally in
the whole of Western Europe in medieval times-a mass of
normative particularisms. One of the fundamental constitutional debates in the Renaissance and post-Renaissance periods was
whether this settled mass of particularisms should be disturbed. 14 There was great resistance to disturbing them. It is an
interesting paradox that our own Declaration of Independence--declaring the foundation of a new political ordershould rest in part on the grievance that ancient particular
rights had been overturned, and that our own Constitution
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while creating a new political order put some rights, such as
rights of property, beyond the full reach of political authority.
The most revolutionary of the post-Renaissance legal revolutions was expressed of course by the Napoleonic Code. The
very purpose, aim, and effect of these codes was to displace the
mass of legal particularism, lingering in France and then elsewhere in Western Europe, with general principles. Certainly it
was Bentham's aim to get rid of such ancient usages:
"If we could conceive a new people, a race of children, the
legislator, finding no expectations in existence to thwart
his plans, might fashion them at his pleasure, as the
sculptor shapes a block of marble. But, as there already
exists in every clime a multitude of expectations, based
upon ancient laws or time-honoured customs, the legislator is obliged to pursue a system of conciliation and con' 15
cession, which hampers him at every turn."
By constrast with the compendium of medieval legal miscellany reflected in the Doomsday Book, or the normative localisms
that the Code Napoleon undertook to destroy, the corpus of
modern legislation is the essence of principled law-making. The
accumulation of statutes enacted by modern legislatures can
through application of rational principles be classified into
codes. Legislative revision and recodification is indeed now a
standard legislative process.
Let us consider another definition by contrast, this time
comparing the content of public legislation with the content of
the internal norms of governance of private organizations such
as businesses, clubs, universities, and unions. It is unconventional to consider the internal governance of such organizations
as "law," but surely it is in some very important respects.' 6
Private organizations, to the extent their powers and internal
affairs are not regulated by supervening legislation, are governed by contract and internal custom. The rights and obligations so established are enforcible initially by private action but
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ultimately by legal process. For example, an employee of a
business is subject to sanctions such as discharge by his employer, and in most cities tenants and landlords can have a similar
parting of the ways by private action. The sociologist or anthropologist would remind us that these private non-legal norms
are backed initially and primarily by private non-legal sanctions-sanctions such as being shunned, berated, bad-mouthed,
or left out of the social intercourse of the immediate context.
The same is true of the structure of governance within a firm, a
faculty, a congregation or a union.
Enough has been said to indicate that private governance,
with norms and sanctions, is ubiquitous even in our relatively
law-ridden modern society. In the daily life of real people, as
distinct from lawyers, these private political systems, among
which we should also include the family, are what the normative aspect of existence is mostly about. The law as lawyers
know it is remote, and only episodically significant-just as the
king's common law was remote and only episodically significant
in the life of the medieval manner or vill. The governance of
these private polities-families, businesses, neighborhoods,
churches, clubs, ect.-is constituted of local, informal, ad hoc,
ad hominem, traditional, unsystematic customs, usages, and
ways.
Of course, there are private by-laws and company policy,
manuals and standard procedures. Relative to the group's informal norms, such compilations are systematic and coherent,
often resembling a legal code in this respect. But by-laws and
company policy manuals, even in the most bureaucratized organizations, are only a fraction of the norms that operatively
govern the relationships within the organization. Moreover,
and directly to the point of our comparison with legislation, the
formal and informal rules of a private organization taken
together have no necessary resemblance to the counterpart
rules of other private organizations, even ones that are engaged
in very similar activities. For example, recent sophisticated
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analysis of business organizations often focus on the distinct
and particular operating routines of particular businesses. That
is what the currently popular book on "In Search of Excellence" is all about-the relationship between organizational
norms and organizational performance. The same idiosyncracies are exhibited in the internal governance structures of nonprofit private organizations and in the informal governance of
public agencies and bureaus,
The point of these comparisons is to emphasize the relatively
unique structure of law as such, including legislation as such, in
terms of its generality and internal coherence. From this perspective it is simply a matter of fact that modern legislation like
modern decisional law is relatively very general rather than
relatively particularistic, compared either with law as it was
known before the modern era or with the non-legal norms that
we live with in our daily lives. If modern decisional law is more
closely connected to general principles than is modern statutory
law, the greater proximity is a matter only of slight degree.
Another way of developing the point is to inquire whether it
is possible to formulate a principled analysis of, for example,
the tax laws or corporation law or the law of procedure. These
bodies of law are in origin and content largely statutory, in
comparison with contract and tort, which in the Anglo-American law have always been primarily decisional. As to the tax
laws, my former colleague and esteemed friend Walter Blum of
the University of Chicago contended that the income tax law
could be accurately analyzed in terms of five variables, which is
surely no more than required to analyze the law of contract or
torts. My former colleague and esteemed friend Marvin Chirelstein has indeed analyzed the income tax law in terms of a few
basic principles whereby to make the subject at least as intelligible as contracts or torts. 17 At a deeper level, Professor Blum
and the late Harry Kalven gave us a rationale of the progressive
income taxation that expresses fundamental principles as ex8
plicitly as, say, any restatement of contract or property law.'
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Correlatively, Grant Gilmore has suggested that the decisional
law representing contract doctrine, if critically read, revealed
itself to be unprincipled to the point of unintelligibility.' 9 And
anyone who is intrigued by anomalies and discontinuities in the
law will find them as rampant in the tort law emanating from
the courts as in the commercial law or penal law emanating
from the legislatures.
What has been argued so far is simply a proposition of
political fact: That however it may be considered possible to
measure the degree to which a body of law is "principled,"
statutory law as such is not significantly less principled than
decisional law. The suggested implication is that both statutory
and decisional law, in substance if not in rhetorical manifestation, rest on general principles in much the same way.
IV. Resort to Principle as a Political Necessity

The second feature of legislation to be considered is that
reliance on principle is politically useful and therefore politically necessary in the conduct of legislative politics. By "legislative
politics" is meant the political process among contending factions within a legislature, as distinct from the electoral process
by which legislators are chosen. Of course, principle plays some
part even in electoral politics. While engaged in seeking election, legislators-whether incumbent or would-be-generally
claim themselves to be appealing to principle rather than sheer
cupidity and local interest. That claim need not be accepted at
face value, yet neither should it be rejected on its face. Certainly
candidates for the legislature find it useful to trade in the coin
of principles, a least in communities where the ballot-counting
is honest, and we should not lightly reject the verdict of that
market-place.
Whatever may be the nature of electoral politics, however,
the nature of the political process within a democratically selected legislature would seem to make resort to principle a virtual
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necessity. The point is that without resort to principle, the
legislature is at risk of falling into deadlock and thereby destroying its own usefulness.2 0 Although legislators may seem
only dimly aware of the fact, a legislature as an institution is
only contingently legitimate. Article I of the Constitution of
course says there shall be a Congress. But the continued viability of Article I is ultimately contingent upon Congress's being
able to provide a solution of the law-giving problem that is
better than the available alternatives. State legislatures face the
same problem. The legislators therefore must give satisfaction
in the political marketplace in much the same sense that a
business enterprise must give satisfaction in the economic marketplace. Otherwise, who needs them? If the legislatures cannot
function as such, we could go back to having kings, or choosing
law-givers by log as the Greeks used to do, or resort to wholesale delegation to administrative agencies and the executive.
I will consider only the case where the legislature does not
fall into two fully alienated hostile camps, wherein a stable
majority is antagonistic on all issues to a permanent minority.
Such situations of permanent dominance rarely exist in a political democracy. Indeed, the existence of such unreconcilable
hostility between discrete groups appears invariably to be the
precursor of either political subjugation or revolution, or both.
In a context where there is no fixed majority confronting a
wholly insular minority, the significance of reliance on principle can be considered from the respective viewpoints of the
21
majority coalition and the minority.
A majority coalition is always at continuous risk of dissolving
in dispute over the specific interests of its constituent factions.
To maintain the cohesion required to stay in business, the
managers of the majority coalition therefore must continually
refer to common interests among these constituents. Morevoer,
since the majority is in constant risk of suffering defection, it
must have a store of inducements by which to recruit replacements from the minority. Sheer patronage is an inducement, of
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course, but it is never sufficient because demand for patronage
is insatiable. The inducements therefore have to be found in
common interests-for terms of mutual forebearance that yield
mutual advantage. Common interests by definition transcend
in some degree particular interest, and are stated in generalities. I have in mind such notions that all should bear some fair
share of taxation, that all should have basic protection of
person and property, and so on. An economic dimension of the
point could be made by saying that public goods should be truly
public. Such propositions begin to sound like matters of principle. It thus appears as a matter of political experience that an
effective majority can maintain itself as such only on the basis of
a platform of proposals that appeal to such common interestsequitable taxes, political equality, or whatever else.
The problem viewed from the perspective of the minority is
counterpart. So long as the majority holds itself together, the
minority is a passive observer and critic, not an initiator of
policy. But the majority's continuous risk of dissolution is the
minority's continual opportunity. The minority's "shadow
agenda" is indeed crafted as an inducement to defection on the
part of members of the majority coalition, either on the part of
the electorate at the polls or on the part of those who were
originally elected under the aegis of the majority. Moreover,
the majority is saddled with the practical burdens that fall on
those who hold responsible office. It is the government that
must make the mistakes, compromise with reality, and disappoint expectations. The incumbent majority continuously ages
from care and exhaustion; the minority continuously charges
itself with the energy of fresh promises. But those promises
must both hold the minority's present constituency while reaching out to the disaffected. And that too requires defining its
program in broadly acceptable terms, in terms of principles of
common interest and appeal.
This is only a sketch of what seems to be the dynamic of the
internal politics of group decision-makers, the kind of dynamic
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that occurs within a legislative body. The point, which I take it
the converse of the famous Condocert paradox, is that survival
in propounding a program through such a group requires
being able to articulate and give effect to a transcendently
acceptable set of normative proposals. When the group is not
able to do that, as our own Congress in recent years has had
difficulty in doing, the group ceases to determine the agenda,
as President Reagan has demonstrated. Over the long term, it is
not in the professional interest of those who have found their
vocation in legislative office to allow that to happen. Hence,
resort to principle.
It might be added that essentially the same logic applies even
when the group is much smaller. It would seem to apply, for
example, to a group of twelve, as in a jury, or even a group
consisting of nine members. Hence, another possible resemblance between legislatures and courts.
V. Legal Formulation in Judicial and Legislative Process

The third dimension for consideration is comparison of the
process of formulation of rules in judicial decision-making and
in legislation. Although only a very abbreviated analysis of this
comparison can be given in a few words, it takes only a few
words to make the essential point. That point is that the processes of law-making in legislation and that in adjudication have
more in common than might first appear.
The judicial process-the decisional process to which Cardozo was referring in his classic lecture-is generally described in
terms of decisions made by appellate judges in response to the
cases before them. 22 The case, not only the facts but the legal
arguments submitted by the parties, is taken as given. On one
hand is a party relying on a settled rule whose policy basis has
been eroded by changing social context or industrial practice;
on the other hand is a party relying on "policy" and the force of
analogy from some more remote legal principle. On the one
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hand is a party contending for the "plain meaning" of a statute,
while the other party is contending for interpretation according
to the purpose and general sense of the statute. The task for
the court is to decide between more or less tightly framed
alternatives tendered by the parties. It is in these terms that the
court's function begins and in which the judicial function has
been portrayed.
In contrast, according to the conventional view the legislature
considers each new legislative problem with a clean slate. The
legislature is free, according to this view, to define the problem
in whatever terms it wishes, to consider the full range of
possible solutions, such as regulation, taxation, and subsidy,
and to innovate rules and procedures by which the solution is to
be articulated. The legislature can define substantive duties,
shift burdens of proof, legalize the illegal, proscribe the immoral, and so on.
There is certainly something to this view of legislative freedom. In a constitutional sense-in terms of what the legislature
has authority to do-of course a legislature has such flexibility.
And there is no question that legislatures have at times undertaken bold innovations. Yet the legislative product viewed in
aggregate, with an eye to the typical case of legislation, reveals
nothing of such heroic character. Most legislation consists of
amendment to the existing legal corpus, generally minor
amendment at that. More fundamentally, even major legislation usually consists of very traditional components put together in slightly rearranged form. Thus, the Interstate Commerce
Act largely imitated state legislation that had been on the books
for decades; most subsequent independent regulatory agencies
created by the federal government were closely patterned on
the Interstate Commerce Commission; the Uniform Commercial Code was very largely a rewrite of the old Sales Act and the
Negotiable Instruments Act; the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were a procedural magpie's nest. And so on.
A distinguished predecessor in giving these Cardozo lectures,
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a lawmaker with broad experience in all forms of law-making,
has put the point very succinctly. In his 1965 Cardozo Lecture,
Chief Judge Breitel said:
"It is often thought that the legislative process is a relatively free-wheeling one, untouched by precedent, tradition,
policies, or the need to justify its products in elaborated
rational fashion. The contrary is true. The legislative process by its own internal traditions, as well as its external
political necessities, is also controlled by precedents, traditions, and policy considerations. This is true in the area of
public law. It is dramatically true in the area of private
23
law."
This imitative and derivative pattern of legislation is not
accidental. Quite the contrary, it expresses basic legal and
political necessity. Legally, if one wants to accomplish a result
through new legislation, the most likely instrument is something that has worked before and which the judges and lawyers
will understand. Politically, if one wants to explain how a
proposal will work, and what it will avoid doing as well as what
it will do, the most effective means is to point to an existing
example. Indeed, there is a kind of law of inverse relationship
between the aim of a legislative measure and the means employed to accomplish its result: The more far-reaching the
statutory objective, the more conventional and familiar should
be the components of the statutory instrument.
Thus, legislation in fact works very much by a system of
precedent rather than by surges of normative inspiration. And
the accumulation of precedent expressed in legislation manifests general principles-accepted basic terms for the ordering
of society.
If the legislative process considered in full view is largely a
system of precedent, the judicial process considered in full view
actually entails a far wider range of alternatives than those
served up to the appellate court. Before an appellate court is
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given opportunity to reshape the law, that opportunity has
been shaped in form of the case presented to the court. Obviously, the case may bear the imprint of the trial court-the
record, the rulings, the findings, and so on. All of those trial
court choices pro tanto define the possibilities that open when
the case has reached appeal. Even more determinative is the
work of the lawyers, particularly the plaintiffs lawyer, in bringing the case in the first place.
We are considering here "leading edge" cases, those in which
an appellate court may eventually have occasion to make the
fateful choices to which Cardozo referred. Such cases arrive in
court, initially in the trial court and later in the appellate courts,
as products of the lawyers' legal transformation of raw normative potential into more or less specific legal proposals. What
was legally amorphous and protean has been hammered into
familiar legal propositions. The lawyer has been first draftsman
so to speak-that is, author of the first draft of the work that
will become the appellate court's ultimate legal product. In that
first draft, the lawyer selects from the dull range of the common law's possibilities. He or she settles on those that are most
promising, i.e., which will find most ready acceptance before a
skeptical and often unwilling appellate bench. And what possibilities are most promising? Those, of course, that are more
conventional and most familiar, manifesting generally accepted
principles. 2 4 Just the choices made by the legislative draftsman.
VI. Principle and the Modern Mind

The final proposition that I wish to advance for consideration is that modern legislation is based on principle because
thinking in terms of general principles is the medium of our
very minds. This is not to say that the modern mind cannot
think in terms of isolated specifics, or to deny the existence of
other tendencies in modern thought, such as extreme egoism,
political romanticism, or religious fanaticism. It is only to say
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that in the Twentieth Century when we think of the objects and
means of legislation, we think in terms of generalizations and
universals. This mode of thought predominates regardless of
our political aims and political philosophy, and regardless of
the theories of history and of social interaction we may hold.
Thus, while Marx and Marxism radically contradict Adam
Smith and the neoclassical economists, for example, all economic theories hold that the behavior of man operates according to general rules. So also, not all of Freud's successors agree
with his explanation of psychic behavior, but they all agree that
psychic behavior is rationally explicable. We all work with
generalizations about existence.
The generalizations about existence that emanate from modern social science, whether economics or sociology or psychology, are the predicates of modern law-making. All legal norms
state or imply some theory of causation, because concepts of
responsibility and authority are unintelligible without theories
of causation. The witchcraft trials during the Renaissance were
premised on a supposition that witches were capable of bewitching; the modern theory of criminal responsibility is premised on the supposition that some persons who appear bedeviled are in fact incapable of controlling their own conduct.
Modern theories of causation are formulated in scientific generalizations: the laws of thermodynamics, of cybernetics, and so
on. We believe no longer that any chain of events is analytically
unique, but that all chains of events are in principle explicable
in common terms. Otherwise, we would not see a connection
between deaths in Bhopal and risk of death in Institute, West
Virginia.
More immediately relevant to legal analysis, whether we are
thinking about judicial decisions or statutes, we think in terms
of economic, sociological and political principles that operate
across specific legal contexts. The economic concept of cost
applies whether we are talking about breach of contract or
criminal sanctions; the sociological concept of social identity
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applies whether we are talking about race discrimination or
military discipline; the political concept of public information
applies whether we are talking about the law of evidence or the
law of defamation.
As the baffling and illuminating Foucault says:
"[T]he positivity of the human sciences rests simultaneously upon ... the three domains of biology, economics, and
the study of language . . . [F]unction and norm, conflict and
rule, signification and system completely cover the entire
25
domain of what can be known about man."

More trenchantly and pragmatically, Chief Judge Breitel
said:
"Indeed, man, even the non-rationalist himself, is doomed
to debate, communicate, and decide by the rational process. His mind has no other way to do its work in its
waking moments outside of a mental hospital. 26
These being the structural components of our ideas of what
goes on in the world, they are also the structural components of
our ideas of what ought to go on in the world. In the empirical
assessments by which we explain events to ourselves, we project
from the past into the present, and from the present into the
future in terms of such structural components. In the normative assessments by which we explain who is responsible for
what, now or in the future, we follow the same pathways.
Indeed, it is only because our minds proceed on such pathways
that we can conceive the idea of legal inconsistency. At one
time, the official doctrine in Western society was that all events
were the work of God. On that basis, any question of inconsistency in the ways of mankind is presumptuous at least, and
incoherent at worst. What is Is. God made it, and if anyone is
bothered by the situation, he ought take it up with Him later.
There is a weaker form of much the same idea, one that still has
a strong following. This the theory of vested rights: Whatever
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was Is. In a pure theory of vested rights, questions of inconsistency are legally outre. In a regime governed by such a theory,
law is not an analytic undertaking but a complex descriptive
one, like the Doomsday Book. We have gone beyond that point
of view.
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